This study presents a critical review of disclosed, documented, and malicious cybersecurity incidents in the water sector to inform safeguarding efforts against cybersecurity threats. The review is presented within a technical context of industrial control system architectures, attack-defense models, and security solutions. Fifteen incidents have been selected and analyzed through a search 1 Hassanzadeh strategy that included a variety of public information sources ranging from federal investigation reports to scientific papers. For each individual incident, the situation, response, remediation, and lessons learned are compiled and described. The findings of this review indicate an increase in the frequency, diversity, and complexity of cyber-threats to the water sector. While the emergence of new threats, such as ransomware or cryptojacking, is observed, a recurrence of similar vulnerabilities and threats, such as insider threats, is also evident, emphasizing the need for an adaptive, cooperative, and comprehensive approach to water cyber-defense.
Hassanzadeh January 31, 2020 visualization options to implement and evaluate security modifications; and, 4) Critical and realtime business operations in OT, along with safety regulations, prevent immediate implementation of remediation options that may require system interruptions. In light of the above, security experts have proposed some work-around options to limit the access of users to the OT network. Other efforts in the ICS security field are constantly improving standards, protocols, and devices to support security features.
The new generation of converged IT-OT networks in industrial control systems, also referred to as Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), is no longer air-gapped. Figure 1c depicts a typical integrated ICS network consisting of multiple levels and zones, also known as the Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) Security standard (ISA-62443) (Krutz 2005) . A zone is in fact a set of assets (IT or OT devices) grouped together to provide a subclass of services and applications for the entire ICS network. The main zones can be described as follows:
• Enterprise Zone that includes assets for business logistics and enterprise systems, representing Level 4 and 5, respectively. This zone is also known as IT network.
• Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates IT and OT networks, thus preventing direct access to OT devices from the IT network. All corporate-accessible services (e.g., web, email) reside in this zone.
• Manufacturing Zone and Control Zone. The former refers to the entire OT domain, including Levels 0, 1, 2, and 3; the latter refers to Levels 0, 1, and 2, so it is equivalent to the traditional ICS architecture shown in Figure 1a . Level 3 provides site-level operation and asset management. Plant historian, production scheduling and reporting, patch and file services reside at Level 3 (Hassanzadeh et al. 2015) .
ATTACK AND DEFENSE MODELS
The incidents reviewed in this paper can be comprehended more effectively with some knowledge of attack and defense models, which are introduced next. 5 Hassanzadeh January 31, 2020
Attack models
From the attacker's perspective, a systematic process consisting of several steps or individual malicious activities is required to obtain the desired effect on the victim's network. Lockheed
Martin researchers have expanded the kill chain concept used in military applications to define the Cyber Kill Chain (CKC) (Hutchins et al. 2011) , which models the life cycle of an attack based on the fact that the adversary uses a series of malicious activities (also called intrusions or single-step attack) and adjusts each step based on the success or failure of the previous step. CKC steps are defined as reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control (C2), and actions on objectives. Inspired by the CKC model, researchers have proposed several attack life cycle models that are reviewed and discussed in Hassanzadeh and Burkett (2018) .
In industrial environments, the attack life cycle is slightly different because of the different architecture design shown in Figure 1c . The target in such networks can be an asset in one of the three domains, namely, IT, DMZ, or OT. However, in most reported ICS incidents, the target is an OT asset (Hassanzadeh et al. 2015) , since the attacker gains access to the victim's environment through the IT domain and then traverse to the OT infrastructure by launching multiple attacks.
This model is defined as the ICS Kill Chain, a multi-domain, multi-step approach that considers ISA-62443 architectural levels and CKC steps together. Since the attacker may need to repeat several CKC steps at each IT/OT level to laterally move within the network from one asset to another (until he/she reaches the target), Hassanzadeh and Burkett (2018) proposed a spiral attack model to accurately describe the attacker's activities within the converged IT/OT systems. Figure   2a shows a simplified version of this model, which is color-coded to map it to the IT/DMZ/OT domains of Figure 1c . As depicted, an attacker may start with some reconnaissance activities in outer layers of an organization that are more exposed to the public (e.g., web server, mail server), and then find a vulnerable host that can be exploited. Once the first attack is delivered and executed, the attacker is already inside the victim's network, and then escalates his/her privileges and move laterally within the network towards the final target, which is placed in the lower levels. Note that this is a generic model, so there might be attacks that do not necessarily start from Level 5-such 6
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as an insider that uses OT workstations or a vulnerable server in the DMZ to launch an attack.
In light of the fact that an attacker operates in a chain of events (i.e., a set of single-step intrusions), the diamond model of intrusion analysis proposes a formal method called "activity thread" (Caltagirone et al. 2013 ). The method shows not only the attacker's steps and causal relation between them, but also a complete list of features for each of these steps. Figure 2b shows the core and meta features of each single-step intrusion, or event. An activity thread in an industrial environment is a directed graph (like the spiral set of arches in Figure 2a ), where each vertex is an event/intrusion (see Figure 2b ) and links represent the relation between those intrusions from the first step of the attack to the final target. As shown in Figure 2b , the four core features describe how an adversary deploys a capability over some infrastructure against a victim. Let us further focus on these features:
• Adversary is the actor or organization responsible for the attack. The adversary can be categorized as insider or outsider and individual, group, or organization. This is usually an unknown feature in most cyber-attacks. It is important to understand the distinction between adversary operator (i.e., the actual hacker) and adversary customer (i.e., the entity that benefits from the attack).
• Capability is the set of tools and techniques that are used by the attacker. The vulnerabilities and configuration issues in the target environment define the capability of an attacker.
• Infrastructure is the physical and/or logical communication structure, such as email addresses or USB devices, used by the attacker to deliver the attack capabilities, maintain control over them, and finally obtain results. The infrastructure can be owned or controlled by the attacker or an intermediary (e.g., zombies hosts, botnets, or compromised email accounts).
• Victim is the target that has vulnerabilities and configuration issues to provide attack capabilities for the adversary. Victims are either persona (e.g., people or organizations) or assets (e.g., networks, systems, accounts, or information).
In addition to the core features, there exist six meta-features in every security event: 1) timestamp, that is, the start and stop time of the intrusion; 2) phase, or step, describing the position of the intrusion in the entire attack kill chain; 3) direction, which denotes the course of an attack (for example, data exfiltration has a victim-to-infrastructure direction, while probing goes from the adversary to the infrastructure); 4) result, which indicates the status of an attack, such as success, failure, or unknown; 5) resources, such as software, hardware, information, knowledge, funds, etc.;
and, 6) methodology, that is, the class of the malicious activity, such as spear-phishing or denial- 
Defense models
To secure target organizations, defenders can employ several security tools and technologies.
Moreover, they may have access to standards, threat intelligence databases, security controls, and benchmarks. Nonetheless, developing and implementing a thorough security strategy is a very challenging task that requires prioritization and rigour. The Center for Internet Security (CIS)
proposed a list of the most fundamental and valuable security actions called "CIS Controls" that every organization should consider (CIS 2019). These controls are categorized as:
• Basic Controls, such as inventory and control of hardware/software assets, continuous vulnerability management, or controlled use of administrative privileges;
• Foundational Controls, such as email and web browser protections, malware defenses, or secure configuration for network devices like firewalls, routers, and switches;
• Organizational Controls, such as the implementation of a security awareness and training program, incident response and management, penetration tests, and red team exercises. These controls are available and offered in different security tools and solutions. They can have various impacts depending on their goal and implementation: 1) detect the attack; 2) deny or prevent the attacker from accessing assets or information; 3) disrupt active malicious activities; 4) degrade the impact of an attack; 5) deceive the attacker; or, 6) contain the malicious activity to a zone where damages can be mitigated. Figure 3 shows how different security controls (tools and solutions)
can be used to protect an organization against an intrusion attempt at each CKC step (Hutchins et al. 2011; Bodeau et al. 2013; Willson 2013 
INCIDENTS
In this review, a cybersecurity incident refers to an incident that has been maliciously launched from the cyber space to cause adverse consequences to a target entity. All available reports on disclosed, documented, and malicious cybersecurity incidents in WWS happened until the end of May 2019 were considered, but only the incidents with detailed and verified information were then selected. The information sources include reports published by government organizations, scientific papers, internal reports from affected utilities, and media coverage that reported interviews with the involved official representatives. The authors of this review did not conduct any direct investigation themselves. The review is not restricted to any particular geographic region. All incidents, here presented in chronological order, are true positives, with the exception of one incident. This was included due to the massive, negative cry-wolf effects it created in the aftermath of its disclosure.
For each incident, we describe the situation, response/recovery (if available), and lessons learned.
Maroochy Water Services, Australia, 2000
Incident Maroochy Shire is located about 100 kilometres north of Brisbane in the Sunshine Coast region of Queensland, Australia. It has a population of nearly 120,000 inhabitants and a gravity sewage collection and treatment system that processes an average of 35 million liters of sewage each day.
During the period 1997-2000, Hunter Watertech Pty Ltd (HWT), a third-party contractor, installed PDS Compact 500 RTUs at all 142 sewage pumping stations. This enabled to remotely control and monitor the pumps through a SCADA system. In late January 2000, the SCADA started experiencing faults, such as loss of communication and pump control capabilities, false alarms, or altered configuration of the pumping stations. The incident resulted in the release of nearly one million liters of raw sewage into the river, local parks, and residential grounds. 500 meters of open drain in a residential area were polluted.
Response and lessons learned
In March 2000, after monitoring and recording all signals, the investigators concluded that the faults were caused by a human intervention. A suspect was caught on April 23 rd , 2000, having in his possession a Compact 500 computer, a two-way radio, a laptop, a transformer, and cables.
The suspect had served as a site supervisor for Hunter Watertech until resigning due to unspecified disagreements (with effect from December 3 rd , 1999). He was sentenced to two years in jail and ordered to pay $13,111 to the Council for the damage caused by the spill. The sewage spill and its impacts were cleaned up. The process took days and required the deployment of substantial resources.
The main hazard involved in this incident was the unauthorized access to the SCADA system, which enabled the malevolent actor to release raw sewage into the surrounding environment. There were no cybersecurity procedures, policies, or defenses present, and the service contract was deficient or inadequate to handle the contractor's responsibilities. Considering that the attacker was a former supervisor of the whole project, which controlled all pumping stations, the scale of the impacts could have been more extensive. The attacker was indeed a skillful, insider adversary with an intimate knowledge of 
Pennsylvania Water Filtering Plant, U.S., 2006
Incident FBI suspected a security breach at a water treatment facility in Harrisburg, PA, in 2006.
More specifically, it appeared that hackers planted a computer virus on the laptop computer of an employee. The hackers then used the infected laptop as an entry point, and installed a malicious software on the plant's computer system. The hackers were reportedly operating outside the US.
The investigations further reported that the hackers did not appear to target the actual plant, but merely intended to use the computer to distribute emails and other information. It was reported that the attack could have nevertheless affected the normal operations of the plant. For example, it could have altered the concentration levels of disinfectants in the potable water.
The water utility eliminated remote access to the plant and changed all passwords. In the case of this specific attack, it should be noted that the entry point to the plant's computer system was an employee's laptop. Such weak links should always be avoided in the security chain. Due to the distributed nature of water infrastructure, staff often resorts to remote access to connect to key components and check system variables, such as tank water levels. Separating SCADA systems from administrative networks, which are connected to the internet, can decrease the risk to have accessed and damaged the computer used to divert water from the Sacramento River to the local farms. Fortunately, the canals could still be operated manually. In his role with TCCA, the employee was responsible for the computer systems.
Response and lessons learned
The employee accessed the computer system around August 15 th , 2007, and installed unauthorized software on the SCADA system. He was an electrical supervisor with the authority and responsible for computer systems. The intrusion costed the TCAA more than $5,000 in damages.
The employee was eventually charged with unauthorized software installation and computer damage to divert water from the Sacramento River and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine.
This incident is another case of insider attack. In this case, however, the insider was reportedly still an active employee of the affected entity at the time of the attack. (The sources used herein for this incident included McMillan (2007), Weiss (2010) , and RISI (2019).)
Illinois Water Plant Pump Station, U.S., 2011 (a false alarm incident)

Incident
In 2011, a pump burnout at an Illinois water plant was reported to be the result of a cyber-attack.
News of the suspected attack became public after a security expert obtained a report collected by the Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center. According to the report, a plant's employee noticed problems in the SCADA. In particular, the pump kept turning on and off and eventually burnt out. The suspicions were raised in part due to the apparent connections to foreign IP addresses in the log files. This news was circulated rapidly by several credible news agencies.
Response and lessons learned
The FBI and DHS launched an investigation. DHS spokesman subsequently advised that "At this time there is no credible corroborated data that indicates a risk to critical infrastructure entities or a threat to public safety". According to the DHS, the pump had malfunctioned multiple times during the recent years. Additionally, the contractor with remote access to the computer system was on a personal trip in Russia. Investigation of the log files and interviews with the personnel collectively concluded that the reported attack was a false alarm.
Interestingly, this false alarm was circulated extensively by some credible news agencies, such as the Washington Post, causing anxiety and cry-wolf effects. The issue could have been prevented through a more timely consideration of the employee's international travel and pump malfunctioning history. Another factor that likely contributed to the cry-wolf effect was the public availability of a preliminary report that anticipated the official conclusion of the investigations. (The sources used herein for this incident included Nakashima (2011) , Zetter (2011) , and Parish (2011).)
Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District, U.S., 2012
Incident
In 2012, the former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of Florida's Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District illegally accessed the district's computer system to download emails and other personal 13
Hassanzadeh January 31, 2020 documents. He performed these actions using the credentials of other employees, after the district did not renew his contract. He was arrested on account of felony charges, including computer crime with intent to defraud, modify information without authority, and delete information from the district's computer system.
Response and lessons learned
The facility's IT manager discovered emails addressed to the CFO's personal email account during a routine check of the email system. These emails were sent when the CFO was still working at the facility but already informed that his contract was not going to be renewed. Upon discovery, the IT manager informed the police, who then proceeded to arrest the CFO. The attack was limited to the IT systems of the facility, with no other malicious activity or disruptions for the district's operations.
It is still not clear how the CFO got the credentials of his fellow employees. It is important for employees to constantly update their passwords in order to reduce the risks associated with stolen credentials. The CFO used these credentials to access the system from home, suggesting that no second authentication factor was needed to access the computer systems. Similarly to the 'Kemuri Water Company' incident (Incident 8 below), a two-factor authentication could have prevented this attack. The attack was discovered thanks to routine checks, which should always been performed extensively for systems containing sensitive and confidential data. (The sources used herein for this incident included Goverment Technology (2012) and WPLG Inc (2012).)
Bowman Avenue Dam, U.S., 2013
Incident
The Bowman Avenue Dam is a small hydraulic infrastructure used to control floods in Blind Brook creek (Rye, New York). A key component of the dam is a remotely-controllable sluice gate, in operation since 2013, that controls the water flow as a function of water levels and temperatures in the creek. Between August 28 th and September 18 th , 2013, hackers obtained "unauthorized remote access" to the SCADA system; a cyber-attack that allowed them to gather information on water levels, temperature, and the status of the sluice gate. The gate was manually disconnected for maintenance at the time of the intrusion, so hackers could not have the opportunity of taking direct control of the sluice gate. The attack was perpetrated with the aid of Google dorking, a computer hacking technique that leverages Google search engine to locate specific strings-and thereby vulnerabilities-in web applications, such as the one used to monitor and control the sluice gate. The hacker's action should not be classified as an intrusion, but rather as reconnaissance, namely the first stage of the CKC (see Figure 2a ), in which the attacker just gathers information on a potential target by looking for publicly available information on the Internet. The attacker used a standalone PC of the dam's system to access its control network. However, at the time of attack, the control system was only gathering water level information and storing it on a spreadsheet. "The control system was attached to the Internet via a cellular modem but was directly Internet accessible and not protected by a firewall or authentication access controls.".
Response and lessons learned
Since The attack was caused by a fired employee of the company that manufactured the smart water meters-named company A in court's documents-who gained unauthorized access to protected computers. More specifically, the employee used to work as a field radio frequency engineer and was fired in November 2013. A few weeks later, using his access to the base station network, he conducted various malicious activities, such as changing the root passwords, modifying the TGB radio frequency, and overwriting computer scripts.
This abnormality drew the attention of the Federal government and caused investigations about possible cyber-attacks against the water infrastructures. Since the attack disabled the communication between utilities and their data collection network, the organizations had to resume manual data gathering. In addition, company A had to carry out forensic investigations at its own expenses to identify the attacker, characterize the attacks, and find and repair the damage.
Though the utilities suspected that the disgruntled employee could have accessed the systems before May 2014, investigators could not link some anomalies to the attacker, since login details were not recorded at that time. However, recorded logins showed multiple intrusions linked to the IP address of the attacker's home. The attacker was indicted for several malicious activities, and sentenced to prison and the payment of a fine.
Even though the attacker was not a professional hacker, a default password allowed him to access the TGB. This highlights the importance of implementing access control and revoking access rights when someone is laid off. In addition, it is important to log and store in a safe place all logins and A physical survey revealed the presence of a wired connection between the utility's internet payment application and the AS400 system. Since the AS400 was open to the internet, it was concluded that access to the payment application would have also granted access to any information stored in the AS400. Collectively, the forensic investigations discovered an actual exploitation of the internet-facing payment application server and the subsequent manipulation of the utility's valve and flow control application. In synthesis, the incident resulted in the exfiltration of 2.5 million unique records and manipulation of chemicals and flow rates.
Access to and from the account management web front was terminated, and outbound connectivity of the AS400 system was blocked immediately. Recommendations were made to replace the antiquated systems with more modern versions. Hassanzadeh January 31, 2020
Multiple exploitable vulnerabilities led to the breach, which could have led to more serious consequences if the forensic investigation was not conducted earlier or the attackers had more knowledge of the utility's OT and IT systems. Internet-facing servers and applications, such the payment management application here, should not be connected to the SCADA. The utility had relied on a single-factor authentication; this is not sufficient, and multi-factor authentication should be used. Outdated systems, like the AS400 here, which formed a single point of failure, should not be deployed, and installation of security patches should not be overlooked. Exfiltration of records went unnoticed for a long time and in large amounts. There should be a monitoring mechanism in place that oversees the transfer of data to enable early detection and response. (The sources used herein for this incident included Verizon (2016) and Mahairas (2018) .)
9. An undisclosed utility, U.S., 2016
Incident
In 2016, the system administrator of a small water utility noticed the emergence of suspicious network traffic data. In particular, the administrator found heavy network traffic originating from the control panel of a pumping station. This triggered the possibility of a cyber-attack and a subsequent call to ICS-CERT. An official investigation was promptly launched.
Response and lessons learned
The ICS-CERT was immediately provided with the data on the network configuration. Address white-lists were instituted. Together with a transition to non-standard ports, these actions enabled safeguarding the network without requiring to put the control interface in offline mode. Within a few days, ICS-CERT also collected forensics images of the network hardware. Reverse engineering of the malware was subsequently performed to determine the attacker, breach point, data compromised, and mitigation strategy to prevent the same attack at other facilities. No details of the key findings have been disclosed.
The situational awareness of the system administrator and prompt notification of ICS-CERT proved to be effective in isolating and thwarting a potentially catastrophic intrusion. Under the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CII Act), DHS has established the Protected Critical Hassanzadeh January 31, 2020
Infrastructure Information (PCII) Program to assure the utilities that their submitted information will not be disclosed. (The source used herein for this incident is ICS-CERT (2016a).)
10. An undisclosed drinking water utility, U.S., 2016
Incident
In late 2016, an American water authority noticed a 15,000% increase in their monthly cellular data bills. The authority was hacked between November 2016 and January 2017. The utility had seven Sixnet BT series cellular routers, which provided wireless access for monitoring the utility's pumping stations as well as a few other sites. Four of these seven routers were compromised by the hackers. The hack was believed to be an opportunistic action to steal valuable internet bandwidth, resulting in the the authority's cellular data bill soaring from an average of $300 a month to $45,000 in December 2016 and $53,000 in January 2017. However, the intrusion did not damage the utility's infrastructure and did not cause any physical harm. 
Response and lessons learned
The use of hard-coded credentials by the routers manufacturer and failure of the water authority to install the patches proved to be major contributors to this incident. (The sources used herein for this incident included Walton (2017) and Jerome (2017) .) 11. A regional water supplier, U.K., 2017 Incident A regional water supplier was notified by several of its clients that their online account details were changed. After the clients credential were reset, it emerged that the details of some registered bank accounts were also changed, so that refunds issued to the customers were transferred fraudulently to these new bank accounts. In particular, the diverted refunds totaled over £500,000 and were directed to two bank accounts in England. The banks holding these accounts were socially engineered and allowed the holders to quickly transfer the majority of the funds to other bank accounts in Dubai and the Bahamas. Subsequently, these funds were used to purchase Bitcoins, which were then transferred to addresses associated with a Bitcoin mixing service, thus preventing any subject to be identified by following this trail further.
The company initially notified its legal advisor about the data breach. When the efforts to track down the bank account holders failed, the legal advisor contacted Verizon's cybersecurity experts, who started investigating in the company's premises. The experts proceeded to analyze the systems and processes involved in managing the customers' accounts. After a due diligence review of logs and web server revealed that no malicious software was present, the Verizon team suggested to interview personnel involved with customers' accounts. The interviews were extended to various stakeholders, including a third-party call center in Mumbai (India), which was responsible for administering the online accounts and processing telephone payments. After reviewing the Customer Relationship Management's log files, the investigators were able to confirm that one employee had accessed all the accounts that were fraudulently refunded. In depth analysis of the employee's computers revealed that, despite the use of a data wiping software, he had sent numerous email messages concerning the accounts affected by the fraudulent activity to another individual based in England. When presented with this evidence, the suspected worker finally insurance deductibles out of its budget. Two weeks after the attack was disclosed, the IT department could bring the city's website and email services fully operational, while the water pump stations and water quality testing systems were only partially available. Although water quality sampling had to be performed manually, the city council's spokeswoman assured that water quality itself was never in jeopardy. The FBI, Secret Service, and DHS investigated the attack and recommended the city not to pay the ransom. Regardless of paying the ransom, as of June 20 th , 2019, the sensitive data being encrypted by hackers were still inaccessible.
While waiting for the attackers to share a decryption key, the local government authorized spending more than $900,000 to buy new computer hardware-purchases which were planned for next year. According to a councilperson, most of the existing hardware was old and outdated, which made it vulnerable to the cyber-attack. In addition, the city's computer network was not updated, and patches were not installed on time.
It is known that local governments and small public utilities are less prepared for cyber-attacks, since they lack the budget and professionals needed to secure their IT and OT systems. That said, basic cybersecurity training raises awareness, and reduces the possibility of succumbing to devastating attacks unleashed by the naivety of uninformed employees, such as the case for Riviera
Beach. Although paying a ransom looks like the easiest way to solve the problem, FBI and security experts suggest never to pay ransom as it only encourages future criminal activity. Preventing cyber-attacks from happening is always the best practice. (The sources used herein for this incident included Doris (2019), Mazzei (2019) , and O'Donnell (2019).)
DISCUSSION
As outlined in the previous section, the complexity of cyber-incidents in WWS has increased during the last two decades. In some earlier incidents, such as the 2000 Maroochy Water Services hack, an insider simply and directly gained access to the OT controllers and performed malicious activities, while in some recent attacks, such the 2016 Kemuri Water Company hack, several IT and OT workstations were compromised by outsiders using multi-step attack techniques. In this section, we review and analyze some key points of the aforementioned incidents from both attacker 24 Hassanzadeh January 31, 2020 and defender's perspectives. Table 2 provides an overview of the time, location, targeted systems type, the investigation teams (i.e., target organization, third-party security teams, or governmental agencies), and the impacts associated with each incident. The majority of targeted systems are US-based water systems, which might be because: 1) they use more advanced networking technologies (integrated IT/OT architecture) and are thus more exposed to the internet; 2) they are lucrative targets for hackers with a wide variety of goals; and 3) incidents reporting and information sharing is more systematically and extensively encouraged, required, and pursued in the US (NIST 2012 (Ablon 2018) . Regardless of their goals and capabilities, attackers can be insider or outsider. Table 3 summarizes the type of attackers, their target assets and domains, and their final action on the observed target. Attacker and group for Incident 4 are not available simply because the incident was later confirmed to be a false alarm. It is observed that insiders are common adversaries in the water sector, as reported for the Key Largo Wastewater Treatment District, Maroochy Shire, Tehama Colusa Canal Authority, the five Eastern water utilities attacks, and a regional water supplier hack (Incidents 1, 3, 5, 7, and 11) . This suggests that management and security teams should be more cognizant of changes in the behaviors of employees. For example, in the Maroochy Water attack, the attacker was no longer an employee. However, he still had access to the wireless network. Thus, he can be considered as an insider causing physical and financial damages (both cyber-criminal and cyber-terrorist) who changed the configuration of several OT controllers. In some similar examples, such as Incidents 3, 5, and 7, former employees or contractors tried to cause harm (financially or physically) through an unauthorized access to the IT or OT systems. In case of Incident 7, the attacker chose multiple targets in different domains of five utilities.
The attacker in the second incident was most likely a script kiddie (SK) outsider, who installed malware on the victim's computer to gain access to the internal information and distribute emails and information-there is no evidence of other groups of attackers in the public report. However, it is known that Attack 8 is performed by state-sponsored parties who targeted multiple IT and OT systems that resulted in the data exfiltration and manipulation of chemicals and flow rates. Incident 4 is known as a false alarm; however, several operational issues were observed at the same time, thereby confusing the investigation team. As shown in Table 3 , recent incidents (since 2017) appear to have a more complex nature. The attackers, insider or outsider, have been targeting databases, files, and account servers of the victims for financial purposes. As organizations advance and integrate their IT and OT systems and limit the OT systems from accessing to internet directly, the IT systems become of more interest for attackers and the entry point to the victim's network. The most interesting and unusual attack in this study is perhaps Incident 12, where attackers deployed a cryptocurrency mining code on the OT network of the target utility (most likely downloaded from malicious websites) to use the computational resources of OT machines as part of a mining pool that creates or discovers digital currency.
There is no single defense mechanism that can protect WWS against cyber threats, so the defense teams should use any mechanism (e.g., detect, deny, deceive) offered by critical security controls (CSC) (CIS 2019) (see Table 1 ). In Table 4 , we outline the most needed protection mechanisms and top-three basic and foundational CSC for the attacks described in this study. The foundational CSC are associated to specific architectural levels, based on the attacker's first step and weakest point of the victim's network. We note that in almost all incidents there exists a lack of organizational controls, such as "Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps" or "Incident Response and Management." Although many organizations use proactive approaches-such as routine vulnerability and threat assessment or adversary simulation (red teaming -CSC 20)-to find security flaws in their network, most of the reviewed incidents were not detected proactively. Reactive security strategy, as seen in most industrial networks triggers, is "respond when it happens." Table 4 also shows that most of WWS networks suffer from a lack of preventive security mechanisms (column Deny in Figure 3 ), that is, the first line of defense in cybersecurity practice.
EPILOGUE
Water systems across the globe have increasingly become potential targets for cyber-criminals.
This study presented a review of fifteen cybersecurity incidents in the water and wastewater sector within a context of industrial network architectures and attack-defense models. 
